The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we will propose a self-enforcing agreement by which agents can fight a bad social choice rule which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto if an additional condition is satisfied. The agreement is based on complex numbers and is justified if the designer receives messages from the agents through some communication channels (e.g., Internet). Under the assumption of complete information among agents, the designer cannot prevent the agents from signing such agreement. Thereby, the Maskin's sufficiency theorem is amended.
Introduction
Nash implementation is the cornerstone of the mechanism design theory. The Maskin's theorem provides an almost complete characterization of social choice rules (SCRs) that are Nash implementable [1] . Because an SCR is specified by a designer, a desired outcome from the designer's perspective may not be desirable for the agents. However, when the number of agents are at least three, the designer can always implement an SCR which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto in Nash equilibrium even if all agents dislike it (See Table 1 in Section 3.1).
With the development of network economics, it is not unusual that the designer receives messages from agents through some communication channel (e.g., Internet). For these cases, we will propose a self-enforcing agreement by which agents can fight a bad SCR when they face the Maskin's mechanism, even if the SCR satisfies monotonicity and no-veto. Put differently, the Maskin's sufficiency theorem will be amended for such cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries of the mechanism design theory [2] ; Section 3 is the main part of this paper, where we will propose an agreement using complex numbers to amend the sufficiency part of the Maskin's theorem. Section 4 draws conclusions.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2, A = {a 1 , · · · , a k } be a finite set of social outcomes. Let T i be the finite set of agent i's types, and the private information possessed by agent i is denoted as t i ∈ T i . We refer to a profile of types t = (t 1 , · · · , t n ) as a state. Let T = i∈N T i be the set of states. At state t ∈ T , each agent i ∈ N is assumed to have a complete and transitive preference relation t i over the set A. We denote by t = ( t 1 , · · · , t n ) the profile of preferences in state t, and denote by ≻ t i the strict preference part of t i . Fix a state t, we refer to the collection E =< N, A, ( t i ) i∈N > as an environment. Let ε be the class of possible environments. A social choice rule (SCR) F is a mapping F : ε → 2 A \{∅}. A mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g) describes a message or strategy set M i for agent i, and an outcome function g : i∈N M i → A. M i is unlimited except that if a mechanism is direct,
An SCR F satisfies no-veto if, whenever a t i b for all b ∈ A and for all agents i but perhaps one j, then a ∈ F (E). An SCR F is monotonic if for every pair of environments E and E ′ , and for every a ∈ F (E), whenever a t i b implies that a t ′ i b, there holds a ∈ F (E ′ ). We assume that there is complete information among the agents, i.e., the true state t is common knowledge among them. Given a mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g) played in state t, a Nash equilibrium of Γ in state t is a strategy profile m * such that:
denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game induced by Γ in state t, and g(N (Γ, t)) denote the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. An SCR F is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g) such that for every t ∈ T , g(N (Γ, t)) = F (t).
Maskin [1] provided an almost complete characterization of SCRs that were Nash implementable. The main results of Ref. [1] are two theorems: 1) (Necessity) If an SCR is Nash implementable, then it is monotonic. 2) (Sufficiency) Let n ≥ 3, if an SCR is monotonic and satisfies no-veto, then it is Nash implementable. In order to facilitate the following investigation, we briefly recall the Maskin's mechanism published in Ref. [2] as follows:
Consider the following mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g), where agent i's message set is M i = A × T × Z + , where Z + is the set of non-negative integers. A typical message sent by agent i is described as m i = (a i , t i , z i ). The outcome function g is defined in the following three rules: (1) If for every agent i ∈ N, m i = (a, t, 0) and a ∈ F (t), then g(m) = a. (2) If (n − 1) agents i = j send m i = (a, t, 0) and a ∈ F (t), but agent j sends m j = (a j , t j , z j ) = (a, t, 0), then g(m) = a if a j ≻ t j a, and g(m) = a j otherwise. (3) In all other cases, g(m) = a ′ , where a ′ is the outcome chosen by the agent with the lowest index among those who announce the highest integer.
An agreement to amend the Maskin's sufficiency theorem
This section is the main part of this paper. In the beginning, we will show a bad SCR which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto. It is Nash implementable although all agents dislike it. Then, we will define some matrices and propose an agreement with complex numbers, by which the agents can amend the Maskin's sufficiency theorem. 
An example
In each state t ∈ T , the preference relations ( t i ) i∈N over the outcome set A and the corresponding SCR F are given in Lily a 1 .
Note that either Apple or Lily can certainly obtain her expected outcome only if just one of them deviates from (a 1 , t 1 , 0) (If this case happened, rule 2 would be triggered). But this condition is unreasonable, because all agents are rational, nobody is willing to give up and let the others benefit. Therefore, both Apple and Lily will deviate from (a 1 , t 1 , 0). As a result, rule 3 will be triggered. Since Apple and Lily both have a chance to win the integer game, the winner is uncertain. Consequently, the final outcome is uncertain between a 3 and a 4 .
To sum up, although every agent prefers a 1 to a 2 in state t = t 2 , a 1 cannot be yielded in Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the Maskin's mechanism makes the Pareto-inefficient outcome a 2 be implemented in Nash equilibrium in state t = t 2 .
Can the agents find a way to let the Pareto-inefficient outcome a 2 not be Nash implemented in state t = t 2 when they face the Maskin's mechanism? Interestingly, we will show that the answer may be "yes". To do so, a new weapon -the complex number -will be used. Although it has been well-known for hundreds of years, it has never been used in the theory of mechanism design. In what follows, first we will define some matrices, then we will propose an agreement to break through the Maskin's sufficiency theorem.
Definitions
Definition 1: LetÎ,σ be two 2 × 2 matrices.
Definition 2: For n ≥ 3 agents, let each agent i ∈ N possess a basic vector.
A vector is defined as the tensor product of n basic vectors:
The vector − → C ⊗n contains n basic vectors − → C and 2 n elements.
Obviously, there are 2 n possible vectors
where the symbol i denotes an imaginary number, andĴ + is the conjugate transpose ofĴ. In what follows, we will not explicitly claim whether i is an imaginary number or an index. It is easy for the reader to know its exact meaning from the context.
Definition 4:
Definition 6:
The dimension ofω 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ω n is 2 n × 2 n . Since only two elements in − → ψ 1 are non-zero, it is not necessary to calculate the whole 2 n × 2 n matrix to yield − → ψ 2 . Indeed, we only need to calculate the leftmost and rightmost column of [ω 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ω n ] to derive − → ψ 2 .
. It can be easily checked thatĴ,ω j (j = 1, · · · , n) andĴ + are all unitary matrices. Hence,
Thus, ∆ can be viewed as a probability distribution, each element of which represents the probability that we randomly choose a vector from the set of all 2 n possible vectors
Definition 8: Condition λ contains five parts. The first three parts are defined as follows: λ 1 : Given an SCR F , there exist two statest,t ∈ T ,t =t such thatâ t iā (for each i ∈ N,â ∈ F (t),ā ∈ F (t)) with strict relation for some agent; and the number of agents that encounter a preference change aroundâ in going from statet tot is at least two. Denote by l the number of these agents. Without loss of generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among n agents, i.e., agent (n − l + 1), · · · , n. λ 2 : Consider the statet specified in condition λ 1 , if there exists anothert ′ ∈ T , t ′ =t that satisfies λ 1 , thenâ ... 
An agreement that uses complex numbers
As we have seen, the Maskin's mechanism is an abstract mechanism. People seldom consider how the designer actually receives messages from agents. Roughly speaking, there are two manners: direct and indirect manner. In the former manner, the agents report their messages to the designer directly (e.g., orally, by hand, etc); in the latter manner, the agents report messages to the designer through some channels (e.g., Internet etc). In what follows, we assume the agents communicate with the designer through some channel.
Definition 9: Suppose conditions λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 are satisfied, and the designer uses the Maskin's mechanism. An agreement ComplexMessage is constructed by the agents (see Fig. 1 ). It is constructed after the designer claims the outcome function g, and before agents send messages m = (m 1 , · · · , m n ) to the designer. The algorithm MessageComputing is given in Definition 10.
Definition 10: The algorithm MessageComputing is defined as follows: Fig. 2(a) ). 2: Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns ofω 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ω n (See Fig.  2(b) ).
, and the probability distribution ∆ (See Fig. 2(c) ). Initially, in ComplexMessage all agents transfer their channels to the computer. After then, each agent j ∈ N can leave his channel to the computer, or take back his channel and communicate with the designer directly: 1) Whenever any agent takes back his channel, every other agent will detect this deviation and take back their channels too, henceforth all agents will communicate with the designer directly. 2) When all agents leave their channels to the computer, the algorithm MessageComputing works, i.e., calculates m = (m 1 , · · · , m n ) and sends it to the designer. Put differently, after ComplexMessage is constructed, each agent j ∈ N independently faces two options:
• S(j, 0): leave his channel to the computer, and submit (θ j , φ j , a j , t j , z j ) to the algorithm MessageComputing.
• S(j, 1): take back his channel, and submit (a j , t j , z j ) to the designer directly.
Remark 1:
Although the time and space complexity of MessageComputing are exponential, i.e., O(2 n ), it works well when the number of agents is not large. For example, the runtime of MessageComputing is about 0.5s for 15 agents, and about 12s for 20 agents (MATLAB 7.1, CPU: Intel (R) 2GHz, RAM: 3GB).
Remark 2:
The problem of Nash implementation requires complete information among all agents. In the last paragraph of Page 392 [2], Serrano wrote: "We assume that there is complete information among the agents... This assumption is especially justified when the implementation problem concerns a small number of agents that hold good information about one another ". Hence, the fact that MessageComputing is suitable for small-scale cases (e.g., less than 20 agents) is acceptable for Nash implementation.
Definition 11: Consider the statet specified in condition λ 1 . Suppose λ 1 and λ 2 are satisfied, and m = (m 1 , · · · , m m ) is computed by MessageComputing. $ C···CC , $ C···CD , $ D···DC and $ D···DD are defined as the payoffs to the n-th agent in statet when the chosen vector in Step 4 of MessageComputing is
Note: When an agent faces a certain outcome, his payoff is the utility that he exactly obtains; when an agent faces an uncertain outcome among a set of outcomes, his payoff is the ex-ante utility before the final outcome is realized. It should be emphasized that the word "uncertain" is different from "random":
the latter means there is a certain probability distribution, whereas the former means the outcome is totally unknown before it is realized.
Definition 12: Suppose conditions λ 1 and λ 2 are satisfied. When the true state ist, consider each message m i = (a i , t i , z i ), where a i is top-ranked for each agent i. The rest parts of condition λ are defined as:
Main result
Proposition 1: For n ≥ 3, suppose the agents communicate with the designer through channels. Consider an SCR F that satisfies monotonicity and noveto. Suppose the designer uses the Maskin's mechanism Γ and condition λ is satisfied, then in statet the agents can sign a self-enforcing agreement to make the Pareto-inefficient outcome F (t) not be yielded in Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Since λ 1 and λ 2 are satisfied, then there exist two statest,t ∈ T , t =t such thatâ t iā (for each i ∈ N,â ∈ F (t),ā ∈ F (t)) with strict relation for some agent; and the number of agents that encounter a preference change aroundâ in going from statet tot is at least two. Suppose the true state is t. Let us check whether the agents can make the Pareto-inefficient outcomeā not be implemented in Nash equilibrium by constructing ComplexMessage.
Firstly, note that after the agents construct ComplexMessage, the designer cannot discriminate whether a received message m i is reported directly from agent i or sent by MessageComputing. Put differently, the timing steps of the designer are not changed: Time 1: The designer claims the outcome function g to all agents; Time 2: The designer receives m = (m 1 , · · · , m n ); Time 3: The designer computes the outcome g(m).
Secondly, from the viewpoints of agents, the situation is changed. After constructing ComplexMessage, there are two possible cases: 1) Suppose every agent i chooses S(i, 0), then the algorithm MessageComputing works. Consider the strategy profile chosen by the agents: each agent i = 1, · · · , (n − l) submits (θ i , φ i ) = (0, 0); each agent i = (n − l + 1), · · · , n submits (θ i , φ i ) = (0, π/l). Since condition λ is satisfied, according to Lemma 1 (see Appendix), this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of Γ in statet. As a result, in Step 4 of MessageComputing, the chosen vector will be
Step 5 of MessageComputing, m i = (â,t, 0) for each i ∈ N. In the end, g(m) =â / ∈ F (t). Each agent i's payoff is $ C···CC .
2) Suppose some agent i ∈ N chooses S(i, 1), i.e., take back his channel and report m i to the designer directly. Then all of the rest agents will take back their channels and report messages to the designer directly. Each agent i's payoff is $ D···DD .
Since condition λ 4 is satisfied, it is not profitable for any agent i to unilaterally take back his channel. According to Telser [3] , ComplexMessage is a selfenforcing agreement among the agents. Put differently, although the agents collaborate to construct ComplexMessage between Time 1 and 2, they do not require a third-party to enforce ComplexMessage.
To sum up, in statet, the agents can sign a self-enforcing agreement ComplexMessage to make the Pareto-inefficient outcomeā not be implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a self-enforcing agreement to help agents avoid the Pareto-inefficient outcome when they face a bad social choice rule. When the designer uses the Maskin's mechanism and receives messages from the agents through some communication channels (e.g., Internet), the designer cannot restrict the agents from signing such agreement. It should be noted that the introduction of complex numbers plays an important role in this paper. To the best of our knowledge, there is no similar work before. Since the Maskin's mechanism has been widely applied to many disciplines, there are many works to do in the future to generalize the self-enforcing agreement further.
Appendix
Lemma 1: Suppose the algorithm MessageComputing works. If condition λ is satisfied, consider the following strategy:
then the optimal value of (θ, φ) for the n-th agent is (0, π/l).
Proof: Since condition λ 1 is satisfied, then l ≥ 2. Let
Here we only explicitly list the up-left and bottom-right entries because only these two entries are useful in the following discussions. The other entries in diagonal are simply represented as symbol * . Note that
Suppose the n-th agent chooses arbitrary parameters (θ, φ) in his strategy (θ, φ, a n , t n , z n ), letω
Recall that
The probability distribution ∆ is computed from − → ψ 3 :
Obviously, P C···CC + P C···CD + P D···DC + P D···DD = 1. Consider the payoff to the n-th agent,
Since λ 4 is satisfied, i.e., $ C···CC > $ D···DD , then the n-th agent chooses φ = π/l to minimize sin 2 (φ − π l
). As a result, P C···CC = cos 2 (θ/2).
Since λ 5 is satisfied, i.e., $ C···CC > $ C···CD cos 2 (π/l) + $ D···DC sin 2 (π/l), then the n-th agent prefers θ = 0, which leads $ n to its maximum $ C···CC . Therefore, the optimal value of (θ, φ) for the n-th agent is (0, π/l).
Note: The proof of Lemma 1 is similar to the derivation of Eq. (25) [4] . % A Matlab program of the algorithm start_time = cputime % n: the number of agents. In Table 1, there are 3 
